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Scholarship: Balancing Stakeholder Interests with Copyright Principles,
20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i1/article1.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Recent Developments in the Case for Open Access to
Scholarly Research
[1]
Last February, John P. Holdren, director of the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, issued a new policy designed to
increase open access to federally-financed research. 1 The memorandum,
covering federal agencies with annual expenditures in excess of $100
million for scientific research and development, requires, inter alia, that:
(1) agencies develop “clear and coordinated policies” to make federallyfunded studies freely available to the public within one year of publication,
*CJ Ryan received an A.B. from Dartmouth College, a M.Ed. degree from the University
of Notre Dame, and a J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law,
where he was Notes Editor on Volume 101 of the KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL. In July
2012, Kentucky Governor Steven L. Beshear appointed CJ to serve a one-year term on
the Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education, the Commonwealth’s higher
education policy and regulation board. CJ would like to thank Professor Brian L. Frye, of
the University of Kentucky College of Law, for his contributions to this article.
1

See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Director, Exec. Office of the President, Office
of Sci. and Tech. Policy, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 1 (Feb. 22, 2013),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp_public_access_memo
_2013.pdf.
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and (2) researchers account for and manage the digital data resulting from
federally-funded scientific research. 2 In addition, the policy requires data
from publicly-funded research to be stored for “long-term preservation
and [be] publicly accessible to search, retrieve, and analyze in ways that
maximize the impact and accountability of the Federal research
investment.” 3 The policy also encourages agencies to collaborate with
each other as well as with private entities to accomplish these important
goals. 4
[2]
This new policy marks an important step toward open access and
appears to have satisfied both publishers and most open access advocates. 5
The policy’s purpose is clear: it rests upon the proposition that citizens
deserve easy access to the results of scientific research funded by their tax
dollars. 6 The Office of Science and Technology Policy has examined the
2

See id. at 1-6.

3

Id. at 3.

4

See id. at 4.

5

Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition (SPARC), a leader in the open
access movement, and the Association of Research Libraries “celebrated the news,
calling the new policy ‘historic.’ . . . [T]he Association of American Publishers, which
has often clashed with open-access advocates. . . . issued a statement calling the policy a
‘reasonable, balanced resolution.’” Jennifer Howard, Activists and Publishers Cheer
Policy on Open Access but Look to Next Battle, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 8, 2013, at
A6; see The Fair Access to Science and Technology Research Act (FASTR), AM. LIBR.
ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/access/legislation/fastr (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
For more information on SPARC, such as its Author Addendum and discussion of author
rights, see SPARC Author Addendum to Publication Agreement, SPARC,
www.sparc.arl.org/resources/authors/addendum-2007 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
6

See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 1 (“The Administration is
committed to ensuring that, to the greatest extent and with the fewest constraints possible
and consistent with law and the objectives set out below, the direct results of federally
funded scientific research are made available to and useful for the public, industry, and
the scientific community.” ).
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issue at length by soliciting stakeholder input and convening an
interagency work-group to develop a policy that would balance these often
divergent interests. 7 Among the stakeholders considered were “scientists
and scientific organizations, publishers, members of Congress, and other
members of the public,” all of whom recognize the importance of meeting
the demand for expanded access to the results of publicly-funded
research. 8
[3]
The policy inspired congressional interest, resulting in the Fair
Access to Science and Technology Research Act of 2013—bipartisan
companion bills in the House and Senate. The companion bills’ aim is to
make having the results of federally-financed research publicly available
within six months of publication the law of the land rather than the
precedent of one presidential administration. 9 Between the policy and the
legislation, the timelines for open access after publication differ by six
months. 10 That said, the functional effect of the policy and legislation is

7

Michael Stebbins, Expanding Public Access to the Results of Federally Funded
Research, OFF. SCI. & TECH. POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:04 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/22/expanding-public-access-results-federallyfunded-research.
8

Id. To wit, “over [sixty-five] thousand of [these stakeholders] recently signed a We the
People petition asking for expanded public access to the results of taxpayer-funded
research.” Id.

9

See Howard, supra note 5, at A6; see also Fair Access to Science and Technology
Research Act of 2013, H.R. 708, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Fair Access to Science
and Technology Research Act of 2013, S. 350, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). It should be
noted that presenting companion bills—of any kind—in the House and Senate with
bipartisan support in the 113th Congress is no small feat.
10

Compare Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 3 (“[E]ach agency plan
shall . . . use a twelve-month post-publication embargo period as a guideline for making
research papers publicly available . . . .”), with Fair Access to Science and Technology
Research Act of 2013, H.R. 708, 113th Cong. § 4(b)(4) (1st Sess. 2013), and Fair Access
to Science and Technology Research Act of 2013, S. 350, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013)
(“Each Federal research public access policy shall provide for . . . free online public

3
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identical: providing a temporal window in which publishers and
researchers may capture the value of the publication of new studies while
also allowing for public use once these economic interests have been
realized.
[4]
Though both the policy and legislation explicitly cover scientific
data, research, and journal articles, each course of action also has the
potential to impact scholarship broadly, including federal agencies in the
humanities and social sciences. 11 Moreover, both documents specifically
contemplate the significance of public digital access to all academic
scholarship, without simply confining its importance to the sciences. 12
Also, anticipating the end result of recent digital publication trends, both
the policy and legislation underscore the effectiveness of digital
documentation as a superior medium for storing, archiving, and
transmitting data, while acknowledging the limitations of paper as a
medium for the same purposes. 13
access to such final peer-reviewed manuscripts or published versions as soon as
practicable, but not later than [six] months after publication in peer-reviewed journals.”).
11
See Howard, supra note 5, at A6 (noting that the policy may impact agencies such as
the Smithsonian Institution or the National Endowment for the Humanities).
12

See generally H.R. 708; S. 350; Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at

1.
13

See Timothy K. Armstrong, Crowdsourcing and Open Access: Collaborative
Techniques for Disseminating Legal Materials and Scholarship, 26 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 591, 592 (2010) (“A wealth of knowledge, including legal
knowledge, remains effectively trapped inside paper records, where it can be used only
by those with access to the physical medium in which it is contained. The movement to
digitize paper records and make them freely available online promises to liberate
information, including legal information, from these physical constraints and make it
accessible around the globe.”). For example, the Library of Congress has undertaken the
digitizing of historical American documents and source texts for its American Memory
Project. See id. at 606 n.69. In addition, the Google Books project, which aimed to
increase open access to scholarship, was the recent subject of copyright litigation. See
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying
Google’s settlement agreement with plaintiff authors and publishers who alleged
copyright infringement of digitally copied books and writings without authorization).

4

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

[5]
The policy and the legislation correspond to a rising wave of broad
interest in digital access to all scholarship, not simply federally-funded,
scientific scholarship. It is conceivable, then, that this regime may have
opened the door to requiring open access in all academic scholarship,
regardless of discipline—particularly considering that the federal
government awards more than $40 billion each year to American
universities for research purposes. 14 Should the legislation or a similar
statute pass into law, it would necessitate clear guidance for all academic
However, with vast reserves of knowledge in print, the trouble with digitizing extant
scholarship is the enormity of the task; even the most organized and well-funded efforts
simply cannot make appreciable progress in this regard. In fact, the Library of Congress
estimated that, at its current pace, it would take “almost two thousand years to digitize
the nine billion text records it presently holds in its collection.” Armstrong, supra at 59293.; see Katie Hafner, History, Digitized (and Abridged), N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/10/business/yourmoney/11archive.html?pagewanted=a
ll&_r=0. But see Stacey Patton, Group Advocates Option of Longer Embargoes on
Digital Dissertations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 2013, at A9 (“The American
Historical Association has published a new policy statement that ‘strongly encourages’
graduate programs and university libraries to allow new Ph.D.’s to extend embargoes on
their dissertations in digital form for as many as six years. The association says its stance
seeks to balance the competing ideals of the profession: timely dissemination of new
historical knowledge and the ability of young historians to choose when to release their
research without jeopardizing a future publishing contract or tenure. . . . ‘History has
been and remains a book-based discipline,’ the statement says, ‘and the requirement that
dissertations be published online poses a tangible threat to the interest and careers of
junior scholars in particular.’”).
14

See H.R. 708; S. 350; Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 3-6; see
also CHRISTINE M. MATTHEWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41895, FEDERAL SUPPORT
FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH 9 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41895.pdf; 24/7 Wall St., 10 Universities that Receive
the Most Government Money, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2013, 3:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/27/universities-governmentmoney_n_3165186.html. See generally JOHN V. LOMBARDI, ET AL., CTR. FOR
MEASURING U. PERFORMANCE, THE TOP AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: 2011
ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at http://mup.asu.edu/research2011.pdf (analyzing
research expenditures and different standards of achievement for universities throughout
the United States).

5
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scholarship, carefully balancing publishers’ interests with those of authors,
institutions, and the public.
B. The Open Access Movement and the Internet
[6]
The Open Access Movement promotes robust public digital access,
via the Internet, to peer-reviewed scholarly work—usually free of
charge. 15 The low cost of digitally publishing and disseminating
scholarship, when compared with the average cost of publishing
scholarship in print, has been a significant boon to the argument for open
access. 16 Additionally, Open Access Movement advocates point to the
practicality of the Internet as a more convenient, if not increasingly more
popular, source for publishing, disseminating, and accessing scholarly
work. 17 After all, the expediency of immediately downloading
scholarship free of charge from a centralized digital repository—not to
15

See Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, EARLHAM COLL.,
http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2013)
[hereinafter Open Access Overview]. This is particularly the case with a flavor of open
access known as “gratis open access.” See Peter Suber, Gratis and Libre Open Access,
SPARC, http://www.sparc.arl.org/resource/gratis-and-libre-open-access (last visited Nov.
8, 2013);see also Sean Burns, et al., Lecture for the University of Kentucky Open Access
Week, #Altmetrics: Demystifying the Link between Research Impact and Social Media
(Oct. 22, 2013) (supporting the use of scholarly blogs and gratis open-access publications
for consideration by tenure committees in academic portfolios)). For a strong
explanation and apology of the Open Access Movement by the former national president
of the Association of University Professors, see Cary Nelson, Open Access and Academic
Freedom, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/11/15/essay-impact-open-accessrequirements-academic-freedom.
16

See Open Access Overview, supra note 15. Primarily, the two vehicles for delivering
open access to research articles to the public are open-access journals and open-access
archives or repositories. See id.; see also Burns, et al., supra note 15.

17

See Robinson Meyer, How Open-Access Scholarship Improves the Internet, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 5, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/howopen-access-scholarship-improves-the-internet/278371/.
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mention from the convenience of the reader’s computer, tablet, or smart
phone—objectively trumps traveling to a research library to perform a
lengthy search for the desired scholarly article. 18
[7]
But the Open Access Movement, which has itself benefitted
greatly from the rise of Internet, also benefits the average user across a
multitude of digital media platforms. 19 This is because public digital
access to scholarship makes the public’s vast storehouse of
“knowledge”—Wikipedia, which, importantly, services the search
functions for much of Apple’s Siri and Google—more reliable. 20
Although secondary and tertiary source sites and programs currently
underutilize existing digital scholarly repositories, 21 there is “a potential
symbiosis between Wikipedia and academic research in institutional
repositories,” 22 because as open-access repositories become more
comprehensive, they ensure that the highest caliber of research becomes
the primary source for online bloggers, editors, and even the casual Siri
query. 23
18

See id.

19

See id.

20

See id.; see, e.g., Frederic Lardinois, Apple Updates Siri with Twitter, Wikipedia, Bing
Integration, New Commands and Male and Female Voices, TECH CRUNCH (June 10,
2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/10/apple-updates-siri-with-twitter-wikipedia-bingintegration-new-commands-and-male-and-female-voice/.
21

For example, Wikipedia cites to less than one percent of any digital repository’s
articles. See Meyer, supra note 17; see also Alistair G. Smith, Wikipedia and
Institutional Repositories: An Academic Symbiosis?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ISSI 2011
CONFERENCE: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR
SCIENTOMETRICS & INFORMETRICS 794, 797 (2011), available at
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/staff/alastair_smith/publns/SmithAG2011_ISSI_paper.pdf.
22

Smith, supra note 21, at 800.

23

See Meyer, supra note 17.
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[8]
At its core, open access, particularly public access to scholarly
research, is grounded in considerations of transparency, accountability,
democratic legitimacy, and the fulfillment of perhaps the most
fundamental function of academia—providing educational service for the
public. 24 This Article seeks to address the varied stakeholder interests in
academic scholarship—specifically legal scholarship. In Part II, this
Article presents a current picture of legal academe and explains the
process by which academic scholarship is accessed. Part III explores the
scholarship incentive scheme and evolution of policy and case law
defining copyright and ownership interests in scholarship, and applies
these principles to the modern employment relationship between faculty
member and university. In Part IV, this Article addresses concerns that an
author’s interests are hampered by the university’s ownership of
copyrighted works and discusses the economic and social implications of
open access to legal scholarship. Finally, Part V endeavors to recommend
considerations for model policy impacting open access to scholarship.
II. ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP TODAY
A. A Snapshot of the Current State of Legal Academe
[9]
When U.S. News & World Report began publishing law school
rankings in 1987, 25 a new era of insularity, competition for new students,
and fixation on standings relative to peer institutions took hold of legal

24

See Armstrong, supra note 13, at 593, 597.

25

Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the
Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX L. REV. 1483, 1510 (2004). For a concise history of the U.S.
News & World Report law school rankings, see id. at 1509-11. At the time of this
article’s publication, the most recent U.S. News law school rankings are available at
USnews.com. Best Law School Rankings 2014, US NEWS, http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/lawrankings (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
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academe. 26 Pierced by a combination of “U.S. News-driven ranking mania,
law schools’ insatiable hunger for growth, and huge law firms’ obsession
with profit above all else,” the bubble burst. 27 In January 2013, the Law
School Admission Council reported that law school admission
applications were headed for a thirty-year low, in part, because of
“increased concern over soaring tuition, crushing student debt, and
diminishing prospects of lucrative employment upon graduation.” 28 The
26

See Steven J. Harper, Pop Goes the Law, CHRON. REV., Mar. 15, 2013, at B6-B7
(blaming “the bursting of the law bubble” on, among other things, “decades of greed and
grandiosity[,] . . . the profession’s darker side, including the recession’s exacerbation of
the attorney glut, . . . [and the fact that] law schools and the American Bar Association []
abdicated their responsibilities in . . . an effort to satisfy the mindless criteria underlying
law-school rankings, especially U.S. News & World Report’s annual list”). In reality, the
decline in law schools is more nuanced, but is inextricably tied to the decline of the
economy during the Great Recession and the resulting decline in demand for law jobs.
27

Id. at B6; see Ronald G. Ehrenberg, American Law Schools in a Time of Transition, 63
J. LEGAL EDUC. 98, 98 (2013) (“The economic model for law schools is breaking down
because of the collapse of the job market for new lawyers, making it difficult to justify
ever increasing tuition levels.”); Genevieve Blake Tung, Academic Law Libraries and the
Crisis in Legal Education, 105 L. LIBR. J. 275, 275 (2013); Ethan Bronner, Law School
Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schools-applications-fall-as-costsrise-and-jobs-are-cut.html?_r=0 (“‘We are going through a revolution in law with a time
bomb on our admissions books,’ said William D. Henderson, a professor of law at
Indiana University, who has written extensively on the issue. ‘Thirty years ago if you
were looking to get on the escalator to upward mobility, you went to business or law
school. Today, the law school escalator is broken.’”).
28

Bronner, supra note 27; see also Staci Zaretsky, Law School Applications Plummet,
ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 20, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/lawschool-applications-continue-to-tumble/. This could well be a response to the bleak
marketplace for full time, permanent attorney jobs available to recent law graduates. See
Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL STREET J. (June 25, 2012,
10:18 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023044586045774866234
69958142. Worse yet for the future of the legal profession, significantly less “qualified”
prospective law school applicants sat for the LSAT in 2012 than did in 2011, suggesting
that the wrong students—the top performers—have written off their plan to pursue a law
degree. See Jordan Weissmann, The Wrong People Have Stopped Applying to Law
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number of law school applicants this year—54,000—is nearly half of what
it was in 2004. 29
[10] As the volume of law school applications rose in the last quarter of
the twentieth century, universities increasingly treated their law schools as
profit centers: while data from private law schools is virtually inaccessible,
a 2010 report from the University of Baltimore School of Law
corroborates a widely held view that universities appropriate between
twenty and twenty-five percent of their law schools’ gross revenues. 30
Dwindling applications and enrollment in the last few months has
prompted law schools to layoff and buyout valuable employees. 31 Many
School, ATLANTIC (April 10, 2012, 10:37 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/the-wrong-people-have-stoppedapplying-to-law-school/255685/.
29

See id.; see also Harper, supra note 26, at B6.

30

See Harper, supra note 26, at B7. Perhaps, for this very reason, a respected two-year
law degree—or at least an optional third year—is a pipe dream. See Matt Barnum, The
Two-Year Law Degree: A Great Idea That Will Never Come to Be, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12,
2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/11/the-two-yearlaw-degree-a-great-idea-that-will-never-come-to-be/281341/.
31

See, e.g., David Lat, A Law School’s Possible Purge of Its Junior Faculty Ranks,
ABOVE THE LAW (July 1, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/a-lawschools-possible-purge-of-its-junior-faculty-ranks/; Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Massive
Layoffs’ Predicted in Law Schools Due to Big Drop in Applicants, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 31,
2013, 6:37 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/massive_layoffs_predicted_in_law_schools_due
_to_big_drop_in_applicants; Jon Wolper, Vermont Law School Gives Buyouts to Ten
Workers, VALLEY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.vnews.com/news/389688095/buyouts-laid-law-members; Staci Zaretsky, Much-Maligned Law School Conducts
Faculty and Staff Layoffs, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 16, 2013, 12:09 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/much-maligned-law-school-conducts-faculty-and-stafflayoffs/ (referencing extensive layoffs at Thomas Jefferson School of Law). See
generally Erin Fuchs, The Law School Crisis Could Crush ‘Stand-Alone’ Schools, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/which-law-schoolsmight-fail-2013-1.

10
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have attacked the U.S. News methodology for compiling its law school
rankings as a source of fuel for the conflagration that has engulfed legal
education in recent months, 32 even suggesting that faculty production of
scholarship is so vital to legal academe that SSRN output should be the
measure of a law school’s faculty. 33 Whatever the cause of these
32

Professor Harper argues that “[f]lawed methodology infects each category—quality
assessment, selectively, placement, and resources.” Harper, supra note 26, at B7. For
example,
[q]uality assessment is the biggest contributor to a law school’s U.S.
News ranking, accounting for [forty] percent of its total score. The
category itself is a misnomer because it doesn’t reflect quality at all.
Rather, using statistically suspect samples of scholars and practicing
lawyers, it’s a superficial and unreliable assessment of a school’s
reputation.
Id. At the same time, Professors Black and Caron recognize that
legal scholars can neither cede to a news magazine the task of
measuring our performance, nor pretend that the U.S. News rankings do
not matter, nor simply complain about their weaknesses and hope they
will improve over time. Instead, we need to produce our own measures
that capture attributes that U.S. News misses.
Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure
Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83, 84 (2006). For a discussion of U.S. News’
rankings methodology, see Sam Flanigan & Robert Morse, Methodology: Best Law
School Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/articles/2013/03/11/methodology-best-law-schools-rankings.
33

See Black & Caron, supra note 32, at 84-85 (“The methods for ranking the scholarly
performance of law faculties include reputation surveys . . .[,] publication counts . . .[,]
and citation counts . . . . Each offers a useful but partial picture of faculty performance.
Our modest claim is that SSRN-based measures can offer a different, also useful, albeit
also partial, picture that has its own set of limits and biases, but at the same time can
address some of the deficiencies in other measures.”). See generally Richard A. Danner
et al., The Durham Statement Two Years Later: Open Access in the Law School Journal
Environment, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 39 (2011), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2988&context=faculty_schol
arship; James M. Donovan & Carol A. Watson, Citation Advantage of Open Access Legal
Scholarship, 103 LAW LIBR. J. 553 (2011), available at
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problems, the landscape of legal academe—a historically immutable
field 34—is incontrovertibly changed and must adapt to the modern market
to reestablish its relevancy. Doing so requires reclaiming the primary
public functions of legal academe: (1) keeping up with the needs of the
profession and the public, 35 and (2) educating the profession and the
public on legal affairs. 36
B. Access to Legal Scholarship
[11] Academic scholarship is subject to the practices of the proprietary
publishing industry, which, for both academicians and universities, places
certain restrictions on scholarship: from access policies and subscription
fees to the copyright assignment requirement of several scholarly
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=law_lib_a
rtchop.
34

See, e.g., LAURENCE A. WEINSTEIN, MOVING A BATTLESHIP WITH YOUR BARE HANDS:
GOVERNING A UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 4, 6 (1993) (comparing, hyperbolically, effecting
change in academic institutions to “moving a battleship with your bare hands”); Neil R.
Kestner, The Changing Landscape of Academics as Affected by New Communications
Technology, in THE TRANSITION FROM PAPER: WHERE ARE WE GOING AND HOW WILL
WE GET THERE? (R. Stephen Berry & Anne Simon Moffat eds., 2001), available at
https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=562. As an aside, I
would like to include a paraphrased joke told to me by a former-state-supreme-courtjustice-turned-law-school dean, who shall remain nameless: “If you took an architecture
professor from fifty years ago and placed him in an architecture classroom today, he
wouldn’t have the foggiest idea where he is. However, if you took a law professor from
the last century and put him at the front of a classroom today, he would be right at home
lecturing on Palsgraf.”
35

See Bronner, supra note 27.

36

“[E]xploring whether data about papers posted on the Social Science Research
Network (SSRN) can supplement existing methods for ranking law school faculties,”
Professors Black and Caron believe that the result will inure to the benefit of the public as
well as create a more transparent and objective picture of legal academe. Black & Caron,
supra note 32, at 84-85.
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journals. 37 In the last decade, university libraries have been forced to
choose between purchasing monographs and journal subscriptions, or
undergoing complete deaccession of non-essential materials; in contrast,
the proprietary publishing industry has continued to enjoy considerable
profit margins. 38 This is not to say the proprietary publishing industry is
the villain in this story; it does, however, account for publishing the lion’s
share of academic scholarship to the exclusion of resources that promote
open access. 39
[12] The publication of American legal scholarship, on the other hand,
follows somewhat of a different model from that of the other academic
disciplines; it is lacking in many of the complications that are
commonplace in, for example, publishing scientific scholarship. 40 While
37

Especially given that articles are submitted and peer-reviewed virtually free of charge
to scholarly journals, these practices lack justification and “seem fundamentally unfair.”
Alissa Centivany, Paper Tigers: Rethinking the Relationship Between Copyright and
Scholarly Publishing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2011),
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseventeen/centivany.pdf; see also Columbia
University Senate Endorses Resolution on Open Access and Scholarly Communication,
COLUM. U. LIBR./INFO. SERVICES (Apr. 4, 2005),
http://library.columbia.edu/news/libraries/2005/20050421_open_access.html
(“[T]echnological, legal[,] and economic barriers continue to be erected to obstruct . . .
open access . . . .”); Jennifer Howard, U. of California Tries Just Saying No to Rising
Journal Costs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 8, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/U-ofCalifornia-Tries-Just/65823/.
38

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 386; Karla Hahn, ALR Statement to Scholarly
Publishers on the Global Economic Crisis, RES. LIBR. ISSUES, Feb. 2009, at 6, 6-11,
available at http://publications.arl.org/n8218.pdf ; MLA Ad Hoc Comm. on Future of
Scholarly Publ’g, The Future of Scholarly Publishing, in PROFESSION 2002, at 172, 17275 (Phyllis Franklin ed. 2002).
39

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 411-12.

40

See Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access Law Publishing, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 779, 782-83 (2006), available at http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9593lcb104litmanpdf.
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commercial law journals, 41 learned law society journals, 42 refereed law
journals, 43 and peer-reviewed law journals 44 do exist, their market share is
overshadowed by law journals published by or affiliated with American
law schools. 45 Outside grants rarely fund the production of legal research;
in many ways legal publishing already employs open access funding
initiatives, similar to how universities encourage open access publishing of
scholarship from the other academic disciplines, such as underwriting the
“author pays” approach to open-access publishing, 46 and instituting
41

A number of proprietary legal publishers operate commercial journals, such as
Thomson West’s Intellectual Property Law Review. See generally Intellectual Property
Law Review, LEGAL SOLUTIONS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/lawproducts/Law-Reviews-and-Journals/Intellectual-Property-Law-Review/p/100027780
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013). Since the days of the early republic, commercial publishing
of legal scholarship was a dubious business prospect. For an intriguing history of legal
scholarship publication in America, see Ross E. Davies, The Original Law Journals, 12
GREEN BAG 2D 187, 187-90 (2009).
42

For example, the American Bar Association, the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. and
the American Intellectual Property Association also operate their own journals. See
generally ABA JOURNAL, http://www.abajournal.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2013);
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A., http://www.csusa.org/?page=Journal (last visited Nov. 8,
2013); AIPLA, http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/qj/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
43

See, e.g., Journal of College and University Law, UNIV. NOTRE DAME
http://www3.nd.edu/~jcul/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).

44

See, e.g., J.L. TECH & POL’Y, http://www.illinoisjltp.com/journal/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2013); J. PHIL. SCI. & L., http://www.jpsl.org (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
45

See LEXISNEXIS, 2005 DIRECTORY OF LAW REVIEWS vii (Michael H. Hoffheimer
comp., 2004) (listing American law schools’ law reviews). See generally Law Journals:
Submissions and Ranking, 2005-2012, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L. LIBR.,
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (choose journals published
in the “US”; narrow to “student-edited” journals).
46

One such example is the Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity, committing its
signatories to underwrite the costs associated with “author-pays” models of open access
scholarly publishing. Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity, OACOMPACT.ORG,
http://www.oacompact.org/compact/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). Using this method of
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policies to promote faculty contributions to open repositories or journals. 47
[13] Critics suggest that an open-access publishing model is unrealistic,
ignores vital market factors, and is premised on a deficient understanding
of business. 48 Because open-access publishing methods are largely
untested, do not enjoy the same readership, and have not as yet developed
a financially viable model, these same critics caution that authors and
publishers should be wary of open access publishing—after all, someone
must pay the costs associated with publishing scholarship. 49 These
open-access publishing, the costs associated with publication are often paid by the author
or the institution with which the author is affiliated. See, e.g., Berkeley Research Impact
Initiative: Advancing the Impact of UC Berkeley Research, U.C. BERKELEY LIBR.,
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/brii/ (last updated Apr. 24, 2013); JH Libraries Open Access
Promotion Fund, JOHNS HOPKINS SHERIDAN LIBR.,
http://guides.library.jhu.edu/content.php?pid=315747&sid=2802982 (last visited Nov. 8,
2013).
47

Universities that have instituted such policies include Cambridge neighbors, Harvard
University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See MIT Faculty Open Access
Policy, SCHOLARLY PUBL’G MIT LIBR., http://libraries.mit.edu/scholarly/mit-openaccess/open-access-at-mit/mit-open-access-policy/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); Open
Access Policies, HARV. U. LIBR., http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/policies (last visited Nov. 8,
2013).
48

See Litman, supra note 40, at 780 (“Nobody, [critics] insist, has yet demonstrated that
open access publishing can generate profits, or even support a nonprofit periodical as a
going concern.”); see also David Tempest, Open Access: Developing New Publishing
Models, Editor’s Update, ELSEVIER (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://editorsupdate.elsevier.com/issue-35-march-2012/a-focus-on-open-accessdevelopment-of-new-publishing-models/ (“Blind adherence to open-access idealism is
untenable from an economic perspective, even with an all-digital publishing model.”).
49

See Litman, supra note 40, at 782-83; see also Memorandum on Creative Commons
Licenses, ASS’N LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE INTERNATIONALE (Jan. 22, 2006),
http://www.alai-usa.org/recent_developments.htm (follow “Memorandum from ALAI”
hyperlink) (“Caveat auctor! Let the author beware before she chooses! A [Creative
Commons] license may be appropriate and desirable for some authors, particularly
academics, but, given the dangers the license poses to authors’ prospects for control over
and compensation for their works, the decision to license should be made with a full
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arguments, however, are considerably less convincing in their application
to legal scholarship.
[14] Legal scholarship presents the most straightforward case for openaccess publishing because of its unique independence from market factors
and reduced reliance on the commercial publishers relative to its peer
academic disciplines. 50 The cost of publishing legal scholarship in law
journals is substantially underwritten by the universities with which the
law schools are associated, “to an extent that dwarfs both the mailing and
printing costs that make up law journals’ chief budgeted expenditures and
the subscription and royalty payments that account for their chief budgeted
revenues.” 51 Furthermore, the majority of American law journals rely on
unpaid law students to select and edit legal scholarship, and no one
participating in the law journal publishing process—from research, writing,
selecting, editing, and publication—does so because of copyright
incentives. 52 Perhaps the investment of the law students and their
institutions in the production and dissemination of legal scholarship
through their law journals—possibly even the very purpose of legal
academe—is enhanced by open access publishing. 53

appreciation of the possible consequences.”).
50

See Dan Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 623-24 (2005). That
being the case, in law schools around the country the tide is only now finally turning so
that electronic sources are more widely accepted in legal writing. See Ellie Margolis, It’s
Time to Embrace the New—Untangling the Uses of Electronic Sources in Legal Writing,
23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 191, 191-93 (2013).
51

Litman, supra note 40, at 783.

52

Id. (“[C]opyright is sufficiently irrelevant that legal scholars, the institutions that
employ them, and the journals that publish their research tolerate considerable
uncertainty about who owns the copyright to the works in question, without engaging in
serious efforts to resolve it.”).
53

See id.
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III. THE MISALIGNED INCENTIVE SCHEME IN ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP
[15] Incentives to encourage academic scholarship in legal academe
vary slightly from other disciplines. However, across all disciples, the
majority of publishers of academic scholarship charge expensive
subscription fees and limit access by conditioning publication on the
scholar’s transfer of copyright interests. 54 Scholars’ willingness to
transfer their copyright interests to publishers is the product of a system
that lacks sufficient incentives for the scholars. 55 In academia, the credo
is, and may always be, “publish or perish;” a faculty member’s growing
curriculum vitae and publication record is often the measure of his or her
professional performance. 56
54

Centivany, supra note 37, at 387; see, e.g., Retain Certain Copyrights, U. CAL.,
http://osc.universityofcalifornia.edu/manage/retain_copyrights.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2013) (“Traditionally[,] . . . publishers require the transfer of the entire bundle of rights as
a condition of publication.”). As described above, some universities encourage openaccess publishing with explicit policies; however, these policies often waive the
requirement to the extent that it conflicts with the terms of a publisher’s copyright
transfer agreement. See, e.g., Open Access Policy Guidelines, HARV. U. LIBR.,
http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/authors/policy_guide (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); Request a
Waiver, HARV. U. LIBR., http://osc.hul.harvard.edu/authors/waiver (last visited Nov. 8,
2013).
55

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 387-88.

56

Ushma S. Neill, Publish or Perish, But at What Cost?, 118 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION
2368 (2008); see, e.g., DIANE HARLEY ET AL., ASSESSING THE FUTURE LANDSCAPE OF
SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION: AN EXPLORATION OF FACULTY VALUES AND NEEDS IN
SEVEN DISCIPLINES ii (2010), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0kr8s78v.pdf
(“Advancement in research universities is often described as a ‘three-legged stool,’ with a
‘research’ leg that is far more important than the ‘teaching’ or ‘service’ legs. . . . The
advice given to pre-tenure scholars was consistent across all fields: focus on publishing in
the right venues and avoid spending too much time on public engagement, committee
work, writing op-ed pieces, developing websites, blogging, and other non-traditional
forms of electronic dissemination (including online course activities).”). But cf. Jennifer
Howard, Rise of ‘Altmetrics’ Revives Questions About How to Measure Impact of
Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 7, 2013, at A6 (“Adding altmetrics [a
portmanteau of ‘alternative metrics’] to CVs and dossiers may not be common yet. But
interest in altmetrics is growing fast, as scholars begin to realize that it’s possible to track
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[16] Not only is a large quantity of scholarship publication an important
proxy for a successful career as an academic, universities also incentivize
scholars to publish in the most prestigious journals. 57 The problem is a
vicious cycle: the perceived reputation of the publication enables its
publisher to require scholars to transfer their copyright interests to the
publisher, and the publisher’s ownership of these interests, in turn, enables
the publisher to restrict access and charge expensive fees. 58 While duly
according the importance of publication reputation, the current incentive
scheme that is effectively stripping important copyrights from scholars
represents a departure from the recognition of important cultural, social,
and institutional dimensions of faculty-produced scholarship. 59
[17] When the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to
discuss what would become the Copyright Clause, it decided against the
Hegelian option written by Charles Pinckney in favor of a clause
combining proposals from both Pinckney and James Madison, which is
now enshrined in Article I of our Constitution.60 The Copyright Clause
reads: “The Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of
and share evidence of online impact, and publishers and new start-up companies rush to
develop altmetric services to help them document that impact.”); Jennifer Howard, New
Metrics Providers Help Keep Libraries in the Research-Tracking Game, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., June 7, 2013, at A6 (“As access to scholarly content online gets easier, librarians
feel more pressure to be ‘central to the research process again,’ and altmetrics can help . .
. .”).
57

See HARLEY ET AL., supra note 56.

58

Centivany, supra note 37, at 387-88; see also Jake New, Journal’s Editors Resign,
Citing ‘Restrictive’ Authors Policy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 5, 2013, at A22 (“The
editor and the entire editorial board of the Journal of Library Administration have
resigned in response to a conflict with the journal’s publisher over an author agreement
that they say is ‘too restrictive and out of step with the expectations of authors.’”).
59

Centivany, supra note 37, at 388 n.13 (“[S]ignificant changes to scholarly publishing
will require more than a revised understanding of copyright law.”).
60

See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 22-25 (1994).
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Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 61 The plain language of the Clause’s prefatory language
reveals the drafters’ aspirational intent: scholarship and invention were
meant to educate and benefit the citizens of the new republic.
Recalibrating the measure of professional performance in academe in
favor of incentivizing relevant, accessible publication that promotes the
goodwill of the university, regardless of the source of publication, may
retract the problem of self-reinforcing incentives and realign the creation
of scholarship with our nation’s founding copyright principles.
A. Legal Treatment of Ownership Interests in Scholarship
[18] Ownership of the copyright interests in scholarship is somewhat
ambiguous and is the subject of considerable debate. 62 Under federal
statute, a copyright in a work attaches first to the author of the work. 63
Accordingly, the long-standing tradition of the academy affords scholars
most, if not all, the copyright interests in their work. 64 However, the
practical application of university copyright policies circumvents the
traditional rule. 65 In fact, for the most part, universities claim ownership

61

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

62

Faculty scholarship practices are far more varied and abstruse than this article (or its
traditional treatment by copyright law regimes) allows. See id.
63

17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006); cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
737 (1989) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102) (“As a general rule, the author is the party who
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection.”); Centivany, supra note 37, at 389
(“Determining authorship is typically not difficult because, in most cases, the person who
creates the work is also considered the author for purposes of copyright ownership.”).
64

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 389.

65

Note that prior to 1976, a common law “teacher exception” existed to exempt teachers
from the operation of the works for hire doctrine; however, Congress failed to codify the
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in the copyright interests of works created by their faculty under the
“works made for hire” exception. 66 Under the Copyright Act, absent a
written and signed instrument in which the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise, works made for hire are considered to be the property of the
employer or person for whom the work was prepared, for purposes of
copyright. 67 The statutory hook of works made for hire contemplates the
following arrangements: (1) works prepared by an employee in the scope
of his or her employment, or (2) works specially ordered under one of nine
statutory classifications 68 where the parties have also expressly agreed in a
signed writing that the work is made for hire. 69
[19] Few, if any, faculty works are specially ordered or subject to a
signed agreement between university and faculty member categorizing
exception in the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act, extinguishing the exception
provided by the common law rule. Id. at 388-89.
66

See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). This statute codifies a principle first recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. See
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903); CRAIG JOYCE ET
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 272 (8th ed. 2010); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490
U.S. at 737 (“Classifying a work as ‘made for hire’ determines not only the initial
ownership of its copyright, but also the copyright’s duration, § 302(c), and the owners’
renewal rights, §304(a), termination rights, § 203(a), and right to import certain goods
bearing the copyright, § 601(b)(1).”); Centivany, supra note 37, at 389.
67

This rule is particularly well acknowledged throughout federal court jurisprudence over
the last one hundred twenty-five years. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at
737. See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248; Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896);
Colliery Eng’r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch. Co., 94 F. 152, 153 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1899); Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) .
68

These include works made for use as a contribution to “a collective work, as a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
atlas.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
69

Id.; see also Centivany, supra note 37, at 389.
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scholarship as a work made for hire; in fact, such an arrangement would
be both inefficient and burdensome. Judicial guidance responsive to the
question of whether faculty-created works are considered to be “prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” 70 has been
relatively scarce, but does provide some, albeit complicating, direction. 71
In considering this issue with regard to copyright interests, the Supreme
Court’s multi-factored test in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid 72 represents the standard for resolving the question of whether an
70

The Restatement of Agency explicitly contemplates the employment relationship as
well. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2)-(3) (2006).
71

In one such case, in which the district court attempted to establish clarity regarding the
issue, the legatee of a dancer—who had also been the “employee” of her eponymous
dance school—sought to prove the dancer’s copyright interest in dances she helped create.
Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, however, had other ideas. See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 647 (2d Cir. 2004)
(affirming in part, reversing in part and vacating in part the decision—and the settling of
the rule to the extent it existed—in the lower court). Having said that, the Second Circuit
did preserve an important element of works made for hire jurisprudence, concluding that
Graham, the dancer, individually owned the dances she created during the first ten years
of her employment, because she worked only “one-third of her professional time” and
choreography was not within the scope of her employment responsibilities as Program
Director. Id. at 637-38. However, when Graham signed a new employment contract with
the Center, doing so “altered both the nature and extent of her employment from parttime dance instructor to full-time choreographer,” and thus the dances she created during
this period of her employment belonged to the Center as works made for hire. Id. at 63941.
72

See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-53. For a concise recitation of
the facts of the case, see Centivany, supra note 37, at 390-91.
In that case, a non-profit organization, the Community for Creative
Non-Violence (CCNV), hired James Earl Reid, to create a sculpture
dramatizing the plight of the homeless . . . . CCNV provided Reid with
a concept and a fairly detailed description of what they wanted, and
after negotiating price and cost of materials, Reid created the
sculpture. . . . [When] CCNV planned to take the statue on a tour of
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employment relationship exists.73
[20] The factors to be considered are: (1) the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished; (2)
the skill required; (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (4) the
location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship between the
parties; (6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion
over when and how long to work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; (10) whether the work is part
of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party is
in business; (12) the provision of employee benefits; and (13) the tax
treatment of the hired party. 74 Sealed with ambiguity, the true hallmark of
a balancing test handed down from on high, the Court’s decision
specifically noted that “[n]o one of these factors is determinative,” and
that “the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the
product is not dispositive.” 75 While this balancing test only reveals the fact
several cities to raise money for the homeless[,] Reid objected, arguing
that the material the statue was cast in rendered it too weak to withstand
CCNV’s ambitious itinerary. . . . Reid [then] refused to return the
sculpture to CCNV, registered copyright for the sculpture in his name,
and planned a more modest tour of his own. CCNV then sued to
establish copyright ownership in the sculpture.
The central issue before the court was whether the sculpture was a
work-for-hire.
Id. Using the multi-factor test, the Court held that Reid was an independent contractor
and not an employee of CCNV. Id. at 391-92.
73

In proposing its balancing test, the Court retreated from the “control test,” specifically
holding that "employee" should not be interpreted exclusively in terms of whether the
hiring party retains the right to control the product, nor in terms of whether the hiring
party has actually exercised control over the creation of the work. See Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 742-43.
74

Id. at 751-52.

75

Id. at 752.
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that copyright interests are not decisively settled, it does articulate the
criteria that establishes an employment relationship between faculty
members and their employer institutions, as well as the ownership of
copyright interests in faculty-created works.
B. The Application of Copyright Interests in the Modern
Academic Employment Relationship
[21] Applying the trappings of copyright law as articulated through
statutes and case law discussed above, faculty members are almost
certainly employees—as opposed to independent contractors—for
purposes of the works made for hire doctrine. Universities tend to hire
faculty members who hold terminal degrees and are thus expected to
possess refined knowledge and skill in their field; however, a faculty
member’s level of skill is distinguishable from that of a project-oriented,
independent contractor. 76 Furthermore, the fact that a university chooses
not to wield control over the manner and means of faculty-created works
does not itself indicate that the university does not possess rights to control
faculty creations. 77 Also, while universities serve a multitude of functions,
their business is irreducibly that of education and research; thus, facultycreated works, whether manifested as scholarship, service, or teaching,
76

See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d at 592. A clear
indicator of the existence of an employment relationship is the fact that universities
typically pay their employees salaries, as well as offer employee benefits, and withhold
taxes, whereas such an arrangement is uncommon in a hiring party’s relationship with an
independent contractor. Centivany, supra note 37, at 396. In addition, the
duration of the relationship between a university and its faculty is
typically for one or more academic years with the possibility of
renewal, rather than being limited to a short period of time or to a
project with a clearly defined scope, as is generally the case with an
independent contractor.
Id. at 397. In the case of tenured faculty, renewal is the presumption. Id. at 397 n.77.

77

Centivany, supra note 37 at 396; see Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., 224
F. Supp. 2d at 592.

23

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

form an essential part of universities’ regular activities. 78
[22] Despite this seemingly clear relationship, not every court has
characterized the association between a university and faculty member in
the same light for purposes of copyright law. Such cases predate the
Community for Creative Non-Violence decision, the new authoritative
precedent on the issue, but do also cite academic tradition and the fact that
scholarship is the result of highly-skilled expertise and creativity as
support for deciding that such faculty-created works should fall outside the
scope of employment. 79 Certainly this position has its merits; however,
unlike common law traditions, which occasionally become codified as the
law of the land, academic traditions are nonbinding.
[23] Finally, a faculty member’s motivations for creating a work should
have little bearing on this analysis. The jurisprudence in this area only
requires that the work be actuated, in some part, by a purpose to serve the
78

Centivany, supra note 37, at 397.
As part of their employment responsibilities, university faculty are
generally expected to carry out duties consisting of some combination
of teaching students, conducting research, and partaking in various
service-orientated tasks. Works of authorship resulting from these
activities, including scholarly books and articles, course materials, and
departmental committee reports, are of the kind faculty are employed to
perform and thus will typically fall within the scope of employment.

Id. at 399.
79

See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Although [faculty
members produce scholarship] as part of their employment responsibilities . . . the . . .
assumption . . . was that . . . the right to copyright such writing belonged to the [faculty
member] rather than to the . . . university.”), abrogated by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir.
1987) (“[A] professor . . . who proves a new theorem in the course of his employment
will own the copyright to his article containing the proof. This has been the academic
tradition since copyright law began.”); see also Centivany, supra note 37, at 399. It must
be noted that Community for Creative Non-Violence arguably rejects the assumptions
taken by the Seventh Circuit in these cases.
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university—a very low threshold to cross. 80 Self-motivation to create a
work is not dispositive of whether the work was undertaken to serve, at
least in part, the interests of the employer. 81 Unless a work is made “with
no intention to [create the work] as a part of or incident to” employment as
a university faculty member, 82 the work falls within the scope of
employment. 83 Thus, nearly all faculty-created works are: (1) made
within the scope of employment; (2) of a nature for which faculty are
employed to perform; and (3) actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the university. 84 There exists a strong, nearly irrefutable
80

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 400-01.
[T]he extent to which a faculty work is actuated by a purpose to serve
the university depends to some degree on the category of work in
question and the intent of the particular faculty member. Some faculty
members may create works that are fully actuated by a purpose to serve
the university and would not have created the works but for their
employment obligation. However, many faculty members may be
internally motivated to conduct research, teach, or participate in
service-related activities; they may even feel that they would create
works associated with these activities regardless of whether it was their
job to do so.

Id.
81

See Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc., 389 F.3d at 640 (“Graham was a selfmotivator, and perhaps she would have choreographed her dances without the salary of
Artistic Director, without the Center’s support and encouragement, and without the
existence of the Center at all, but all that is beside the point. The fact is that the Center
did employ her to do the work, and she did the work in the course of her regular
employment with the Center.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 (1958)
(“Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in part to serve the
purposes of the servant or of a third person.”).
82

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958). “An act . . . is not within the scope
of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a
service on account of which [the employee] is employed.” Id.
83

Centivany, supra note 37, at 401.

84

Id. at 398 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
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presumption, then, that faculty members are employees of the university
for copyright purposes under the works made for hire doctrine; therefore,
copyright in faculty-created works vests initially in the university. 85
IV. CONCERNS, BENEFITS, AND APPLICATIONS OF UNIVERSITY
COPYRIGHT INTERESTS IN FACULTY-PRODUCED SCHOLARSHIP
A.
Addressing the Concern That the “Monopoly” of
University Copyright Interests in Scholarship Is a Fetter to
Faculty Creativity and the Educational Function of the
University
[24] From academe’s inception, its uniquely creative environment has
been its defining feature. Critics argue that a university’s exercise of
copyright ownership over faculty-created works undermines faculty
innovation by drastically altering this environment. 86 Further, opponents
of vesting the copyright interests of faculty-created work in the university
85

Id. at 401.

86

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 591-92 (1987). In her article, Professor Dreyfuss expresses a
concern that the works made for hire doctrine hampers employee creativity, especially
among university faculty, because of the 1976 Act’s elimination of the teacher exception.
Id.; cf. Centivany, supra note 37, at 407-08 (discussing how universities own the
copyrights in faculty-created works under the works made for hire doctrine and that
policies purporting to transfer these rights, either back to the faculty member or a third
party, are unlikely to meet the signed writing requirement under Section 204 of the 1976
Copyright Act). But see SPARC, AUTHOR RIGHTS: USING THE SPARC AUTHOR
ADDENDUM TO SECURE YOUR RIGHTS AS THE AUTHOR OF A JOURNAL ARTICLE (2006).
http://www.sparc.arl.org/sites/default/files/SPARC_AuthorRights2006_0.pdf. “As the
author of a work you are the copyright holder unless and until you transfer the copyright
to someone else in a signed agreement” (original emphasis removed). Id. at 3. However,
the ability of a university policy to establish a default position that the university owns all
copyright rights in faculty created work is insufficient to meet the signed writing
requirement, and this finding has been consistently applied by courts. See, e.g., Foraste v.
Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D.R.I. 2003); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1926 (2007).
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argue that universities should not enforce ownership over these copyright
interests at the risk of degrading long-held academic principles and
traditions. 87 Additionally, there are those with concerns that, in practice,
the pecuniary interests of the institution will supplant the non-pecuniary
motivations of the faculty member. 88 However, the current copyright
regime’s treatment of ownership interests in the copyright of scholarship
has neither stunted faculty creativity nor encumbered the production of
scholarship. These concerns, while valid, have yet to come to fruition
since the Copyright Act was revised in 1976 and construed to vest
copyright interests in universities in their faculty-created scholarship. 89
[25] To date, attempts have been unsuccessful to circumvent the default
position that the works made for hire doctrine applies to scholarship
produced by faculty member employees of a university because they fail
to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act. 90 Though the failure of
such policies may negatively impact the proprietary scholarly publishing
industry, such detrimental impact on this industry also remains to be
seen. 91 It is worth noting that, despite these ownership rights vesting first
87

Dreyfuss, supra note 86, at 638 (“In exchange for a modest chance of pecuniary gain,
the university risks fundamental alterations in the environment it creates for its student
body and professional staff.”).
88

Id. at 590-91.

89

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 409-13 (analyzing Professor Dreyfuss’ concerns in
light of over two decades of experiences and discussing the implications for the scholarly
publishing industry as a whole). “Due to its express policies, the university may be
estopped from subsequently attempting to enforce its copyrights against the facultycreator.” Id. at 411; see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.07(A) (2013). A university has a duty to act in agreement with the
terms of the contracts between it and its faculty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
8.13 (2006). To contravene this duty would be a serious blunder, not just legally, but
perhaps more damningly, for brand and public relations of the university.
90

See Centivany, supra note 37 at 408.

91

See id. at 412-13.
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in the university, in practice universities rarely enforce them as against
their faculty members; to do so could diminish what is perhaps a
university’s greatest asset—its goodwill. 92 A university, not unlike other
collective groups, is the sum of its parts. Thus, in place of exercising
ownership rights in scholarship to the exclusion of its faculty member
creator, it is in the best interest of the university, in fulfilling its
educational function, to support the public’s interest in open access to
scholarly works. 93
B. The Implications of Open Access to Legal Scholarship
[26] Believe it or not, the seeds of change—from purely proprietary
publishing to open-access publishing—have been sown at the very top of
legal academe for over five years. In 2008, the Harvard Law School
faculty voted to offer their scholarship “freely available in an online
repository.” 94 Later that year, the directors of the law libraries at eleven of
92

Cf. id. at 401 (noting that “while copyright initially vests in universities under workfor-hire, university policies effectively transfer those rights to the faculty-creators”
(emphasis added)).
93

See, e.g., Jennifer Howard, Open Access Gains Major Support in U. of California’s
Systemwide Move, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://chronicle.com/article/Open-Access-Gains-Major/140851/.
[T]he University of California’s Academic Senate has adopted an openaccess policy that will make research articles freely available to the
public through eSchoalrship, California’s open digital repository. . . .
More than 175 universities have preceded California in endorsing open
access, but the huge research footprint of the California system gives its
action extra significance. . . . The new mandate ‘signals to scholarly
publishers that open access, in terms defined by faculty and not by
publishers, must be part of any future scholarly-publishing system,’ the
statement says.
Id.
94

Harvard Law Votes Yes on Open Access, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (May
7, 2008), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/4273.
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the most elite law schools met at Duke Law School to draft what became
the Durham Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship. 95 Ushering
in the open access era, the Durham Statement called for all law schools to
move toward electronic publication of scholarship, to commit to making
available and storing electronic versions of scholarship in stable, open,
digital formats, and, eventually, to stop publishing journals. 96 The
principal argument for a movement toward open access in legal academe
is an easy case to make: in addition to the philosophical principles
advanced by open access, on a practical level it supports a vital
professional goal of the faculty members by maximizing the impact of
their work. 97 After all, what attorney does not appreciate recognition in
his or her field? Not surprisingly, “[f]ew commentators have objected to
the Durham Statement’s call for open access publication of law
journals.” 98
[27] Apart from these elite schools, however, few schools have
followed suit and very few United States law reviews are registered with

95

The universities represented were: the University of Chicago, Columbia University,
Cornell University, Duke University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, New
York University, Northwestern University, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford
University, the University of Texas, and Yale University. Perhaps an homage to the
Declaration of Independence, the Durham Statement stored on Harvard University’s
Berkman Center for Internet and Society website a list of signatories. Durham Statement
on Open Access to Legal Scholarship, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/durhamstatement (last updated Feb. 1, 2012).
96

Id.; see Danner et al., supra note 33, at 40 (noting that the Durham Statement calls for
open access publication and an end to print publication of law journals); Donovan &
Watson, supra note 32, at 554 (discussing the aims of the Durham Statement).
97

Donovan & Watson, supra note 33, at 560.
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Danner et al., supra note 33, at 40. This may be because the biggest impact of the
Durham Statement manifests itself as organizing principle for the future of its signatory
law libraries. See id.
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the Directory of Open Access Journals. 99 That being said, a growing
number of schools post some scholarship content on their publiclyaccessible journal websites, despite the risks of reducing revenue from
print subscriptions and royalty income from proprietary online
aggregators. 100 This small gesture may expose legal academe’s less than
ostensible belief that scholarship fulfills a public good. 101
[28] While this Article recognizes the strong policy considerations for
applying open-access principles to legal scholarship, the discussion should
also be approached from an economic perspective. Perhaps legal academe
has tarried in adopting open access publishing because of the absence of
any demand to explore low-cost alternatives to the traditional subscription
model. 102 Legal scholarship publishing costs are modest when compared
with scholarly publishing in other academic disciplines. 103 “Law journal
subscription prices are low, and have risen at less than the rate of inflation
for a generation.” 104 At the same time, law faculty members enjoy
virtually free access to electronic versions of published law review articles
99

See DOAJ Members, DIRECTORY OPEN ACCESS J.,
http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=loadTempl&templ=members&uiLanguage=en (last
visited Nov. 8, 2013) (listing only twenty-four libraries, universities, and research centers
in the United States that are registered with the Directory).

100

See Danner et al., supra note 33, at 41.

101

See id. (quoting Richard Edwards & David Shulenburger, The High Cost of Scholarly
Journals (And What to Do About It), CHANGE, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 10, 13. Danner et al.
go on to posit that “in the age of the Internet, a commitment to research and scholarship
carries with it a responsibility to circulate one’s work as widely as possible.” Id. (citing
JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE xii (2005)).
102

See Litman, supra note 40, at 791.

103

See Paul George et al., The Future Gate to Scholarly Legal Information, AALL
SPECTRUM, Apr. 2005, at 1,1, available at
http://www.aallnet.org/products/pub_sp0504/pub_sp0504_MB.pdf.
104

Litman, supra note 40, at 791.
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through proprietary outlets, such as HeinOnline, Lexis, and Westlaw, all
of which require subscriptions. 105 The driving force for open access in
legal publishing comes almost entirely from the perspective of supplying
scholarship: law school faculty members who want to increase readership
of their research outside of legal academe cannot reach this audience
through HeinOnline, Lexis, and Westlaw. 106 The latter two resources
have made vast fortunes from material that is mostly in the public domain,
by making it available subject to useful search functionality, but are
expensive and
functionally irrelevant to academics outside legal
107
academe.
While these powerful search tools are not without value,
reliance on them diminishes when law journals and their parent
institutions develop resources to publicly access and archive legal
scholarship—an idea with the potential to transform legal scholarship as it
currently exists. 108
V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR ENSURING OPEN ACCESS TO LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
[29] Universities, the holders of copyright in academic scholarship, are
uniquely situated to achieve their public, educational function, as well as
to reduce reliance on the proprietary scholarly publishing industry, and
empower faculty while promoting open access. 109 In legal academe, many
universities already underwrite the cost of submitting scholarship for
105

Id. It should be noted that legal research and scholarship require access not only to
other legal scholarship, but also to primary sources of law; thus, “open access to legal
scholarship must be discussed within the context of electronic access to other types of
legal information.” Danner et al., supra note 33, at 41.
106

See Litman, supra note 40, at 791.
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See id. at 792.

108

See id. at 792-93.

109

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 388-89.
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publication and should extend their support one small step further by
providing faculty with financial assistance to cover the associated costs of
publication in open-access journals and repositories. 110 Given that many
universities, particularly research universities, are the recipients of federal
funds derived from public tax dollars, it is in the universities’ best interest
to reinvest some portion of these funds in relevant and publicly accessible
scholarship to benefit not only the profession but also local, regional, and
national communities. 111
[30] With these changes, academe should prioritize the development of
a viable alternative method of peer review. 112 Internally, universities must
shift the focus of the existing academic incentive system, and its reliance
on the proprietary publishing industry, to examine the ways in which
faculty accumulate goodwill for employer institutions. 113 Open-access
journals, open educational resources, and open archival repositories serve
the important interests of the public that are often ignored in the context of
the debate over copyright interest in academic scholarship. 114 The
language of the Copyright Clause could not be clearer in stating that
creation of copyrightable works inures to the benefit of the public. 115
110

Litman, supra note 40, at 793; see Centivany, supra note 37, at 414.

111

See Memorandum from the John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 1-3, 5, 6; George et al.,
supra note 103, at 2.
112

With the advent of altmetrics, digital media is increasing a feasible source of
disseminating knowledge. Thus, the process for peer and tenure review to reflect this
modern reality may already be underway. See Howard, supra note 5, at A6; see also
Leonard Cassuto, The Rise of the Mini-Monograph, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 16,
2013, at A31 (“Fewer advisers now imagine their graduate students’ dissertations
necessarily as books in the making. While the book still remains the absolute standard in
many departments, the group that thinks that way is getting smaller.”).
113

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 386, 413.
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See Donovan & Watson, supra note 33, at 558-59.
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U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Academe’s support of open-access resources is essential; however, it is
not necessary for academe to completely emancipate itself from
proprietary publishers, many of whom serve an important role in the
profession and possess their own stakeholder interests in copyright. 116
[31] The reality is that proprietary scholarly publishers currently exert a
disproportionate amount of control over scholarly works. 117 Perhaps the
best elements of existing solutions proffer the best foundation for the
application of open access to scholarly publication. The temporal solution
put forth by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
appears to handle the interests of each stakeholder—the scholar, the
institution, the publisher, and the public—most fairly. 118 The open-access
repository of faculty scholarship chartered by Harvard presents the ideal
access portal and archive of publicly accessible scholarship. 119 Finally,
when compared with individual faculty members, universities have a
substantially stronger bargaining position to help reclaim the broad
copyright interests that scholars transfer to their publishers as of right. 120
116

See Litman, supra note 40, at 781-82. In fact, the original copyright protection, the
Statute of Anne, was designed to protect the interests of publishers. Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp.

117

See Litman, supra note 40, at 784; see also Mridu Khullar Relph, In India, Academics
Defend Photocopying of Textbooks for Course Packs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 15,
2013, at A15 (chronicling the legal battle by the world’s three largest academic
publishers—Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and Taylor &
Francis—with the University of Delhi and Rameshwari Photocopying Services over the
photocopying of short excerpts of books to create curricular course packs for use in
university classrooms). See generally Centivany, supra note 37 (discussing, in greater
detail, the extent of the control exercised by publishers in the publication of academic
scholarship in America.)
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See Memorandum from John P. Holdren, supra note 1, at 2-3.

119

See Centivany, supra note 37, at 387 (citing Open Access Policies, supra note 47).
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See id. at 401.
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By exercising ownership of copyright interests in scholarship, universities
have the ability to profoundly influence the relevancy and public access of
academic scholarship, promoting both the constitutional invocation of the
Copyright Clause and the primary public function of the university—
education.
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